, Arieti (19SS) , and others have observed an association between schizophrenia and self-concept disorder. The most consistent finding in studies of self-concept in schizophrenia is a wide range of intragroup variability. Self-esteem or ideal-self congruence measures do not distinguish schizophrenics from normals. Self-concept stability in schizophrenia or the conditions affecting it have attracted little research attention. Rogers (1951) and Combs and Snygg (1959) suggested that self-concept disorder characterizes maladjusted individuals. Support for this view was offered by Brownfain (1952) and Engle (1959) . They specifically found self-concept variability to be associated with poor social and emotional adjustment.
Failure is regarded as having an impact upon the self-concept requiring some reassessment of it (Diller, 1954; Katz, 1950) . The less stable the self-concept organization, the more widespread the effects of failure should be. If schizophrenics have less integrated self-concepts than normals, failure should bring this deficiency into sharper focus.
Variability of self-concept responses might only reflect the generalized inconstancy of 1 This article is based upon an unpublished doctoral dissertation completed at New York University in 1962. The author wishes to thank Margaret Tresselt, research advisor, Robert Morrow, Chief Psychologist of the Bronx VA Hospital and Howard White, Chief Clinical Psychologist of the VA Center, Togus, Maine for their cooperation and recommendations.
behavior often attributed to schizophrenics. But the evaluation of his interpersonal self might represent a singular problem for the nonchronic schizophrenic. Other material such as ideas about one's general physical condition and certain preference hierarchies bear less directly upon one's interactions with others and are less dependent upon the latter for their evolution. They should be more reliable and less vulnerable to failure than the selfconcept.
For the purpose of this study, self-concept was defined as an organized system of relatively stable self-perceptions largely derived from and pertinent to interpersonal relationships. It was operationally defined as subject's responses to a questionnaire composed of self-referent statements. Stability was defined as consistency in response to the same items over time.
The hypotheses of this study were as follows:
1. Nonparanoid schizophrenics without evidence of deterioration or crystallized delusional thinking will show less stable selfconcepts than normals matched for age, sex, intelligence, conceptual ability, and tendency to report honestly about themselves.
2. Schizophrenics will show more instability of self-concept than normals following induced failure, while other concepts similarly measured will be less affected.
3. Self-concept instability in schizophrenics is not simply an aspect of generalized variability in such patients. Less interpersonal 
METHOD
Subjects. 84 male subjects between the ages of 21 and 50 were divided into four groups of 21 each: failure schizophrenics (SF), nonfailure schizophrenics (SNF), failure controls (CF), and nonfailure controls (CNF). The subjects had completed between 8 and 14 years of education in the United States, were of at least low average intelligence, and had no suspected neurological disorders.
SF and SNF subjects were hospitalized schizophrenic veterans, in hospital less than 4 months, and without evidence of crystallized delusional thinking or deterioration. They had not been under psychiatric treatment for at least 6 months prior to the current admission. None were receiving convulsive therapy or high levels of medication (as judged by medical staff) at the time of, or just prior to, the study.
CF and CNF groups included staff and some general hospital patients about to be discharged from the same veterans' facilities.
2 Control subjects were without evidence of emotional disorder, psychiatric histories, serious illness, or records of frequent hospitalization. The general hospital patients employed were essentially recovered from minor illnesses. Potential subjects with recent serious illness or chronic conditions were not employed. This was to avoid the problems which could have arisen if sick or very somatically concerned people were dealing with the "Physical Health Concept" questionnaire (see instruments, below). Twelve were hospital aides, and several others were clerical staff. Groups were equated for age, education, intelligence, conceptual ability, and tendency to report honestly about themselves. The subjects were randomly assigned to failure and nonfailure groups.
Instruments. The WAIS Similarities subtest, Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Vocabulary), and a questionnaire composed mainly of "Lie" items from the MMPI, were used to equate groups for conceptual ability, intelligence, and honesty, respectively. Cutoff points were used to eliminate unsuitable subjects.
Three special questionnaires of 46 items each were prepared for this experiment. For the Health-and Self-Concept scales, 120 items of each content type were first created. The experimenter and two clinical psychologist judges paired items from the two lists, on the criteria of length, clarity, complexity, and relevance to enduring types of self-assessments rather than those which might undergo changes from day to day or week to week with moderatechanges in the environment or physical condition of the subject. The 46 pairs used to construct the final instruments were those all judges felt represented a close approximation of equivalence considering the disparate contents. The food scale involved preference ratings for 46 common foods. Items of the three scales each had eight scoring categories ranging from "Completely True" (designated 1) to "Completely False" (8), with intermediate ratings numbered accordingly. Instructions, administration, and scoring were consistent for the three tests. Instructions emphasized that the subject should describe himself the way he felt he usually was. Table 1 gives sample items from the Self-Concept and Health-Concept scales.
Failure task. Failure was induced using a modified Stroop (1935) color word interference task of 100 items. The subject was required to rapidly name the color of ink used to print four different color nouns. The latter were randomly arranged and printed in the four colors of the nouns. RED might be printed in green and BLACK in blue. The task was presented as "This will show something important about you" with no further explanation. All subjects hesitated while performing. They were stopped at a predetermined point (Item 47) and then shown their "score" within a failure category of bogus norms. The neutral task was an innocuous 3-minute chat with the experimenter.
Procedure. The subjects were administered the screening tests and the three special questionnaires during the first session. Testing was conducted in groups of from two to five except with the WAIS Similarities which was individually given. The subjects were recalled 48 hours later and depending upon condition group, were given the failure or interview, immediately followed by the three questionnaires in the original order. They were then given a brief review of the experiment but without reference to the bogus nature of the failure. The subjects were also asked not to discuss the experiment with others and to the knowledge of the experimenter this request was honored. Finally, failure subjects were given a brief standardized interview to determine subjective reactions to the failure. Responses were tabulated for later analysis.
RESULTS
Groups were well equated for age, education, verbal intelligence, and conceptual ability. Table 2 shows the mean values of the data used to equate groups.
Lie score for SF and CF groups combined were higher than for the nonfailure subjects. The mean difference between means of condition groups was .75 (F -4.4S, p < .05). Though statistically significant, this difference is regarded as unimportant except that it may suggest some minor attenuation of variability (especially in self-concept) for the failure groups due to greater orientation toward socially approved responses.
Groups did not differ significantly with respect to tendency toward end responses on the experimental tests and, therefore, absolute per item difference scores were used to evalu- ate the hypotheses. These scores were determined by comparing a subject's first and second responses to each item. Thus, if an item was first answered "Mostly False" (designated 6) and on second testing "Completely False" (8), the net change (without regard to direction) would be 2. Such shifts were then totaled to arrive at subject's total difference score (TDS) for a particular instrument. Table 3 gives the TDS totals, means, and standard deviations for groups by instruments. TDS data were analyzed by two basic methods. The first was a three-way analysis of variance for repeated measures of the same population (Edwards, 1950) . Results of this analysis are given in Table 4 . The second method was a 2 X 2 factorial analysis of variance replicated over three tests. Results are summarized in Table 5 . A significance criterion of .OS for two-tailed tests was applied throughout.
Schizophrenics (N = 42) were significantly more variable than controls in response to self-concept items (Table 4 , Content X Diagnosis). This is consistent with the first experimental hypothesis. Group SF was significantly more variable for self-concept than were CF or SNF groups. Normal groups, however, did not significantly differ in this regard. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is regarded as confirmed.
Under neither treatment condition did variability of Health-Concept or Food-Preference responses differentiate diagnostic groups. Nor did failure significantly influence response variability of schizophrenics for these contents. These findings confirmed the third hypothesis of this study.
The SNF group was not significantly more variable for Self than for Health items though the trend was as predicted (Content X Diagnosis X Failure interaction, see Table 4 and between NF groups, see Table 5 ).
In the posttest interview, both diagnostic groups tended to minimize the impact which failure had upon them. All subjects appeared to believe that the failure was genuine and groups did not differ in reported motivation to do well.
DISCUSSION
The first hypothesis of this study was supported. Schizophrenics appear to have less reliable self-concepts than normals. A stress situation brought this fact into clearer focus. The size of NF groups and the fact that twotailed tests were used, required greater absolute differences to reach significance. Selfconcept stability of schizophrenics was significantly more disrupted by failure than was that of normals, but Food-Preference and Health-Concept responses were not similarly affected. If the schizophrenic's self-concept variability were simply a function of generalized response variability, the latter should have manifested itself equally on the HealthConcept and Food-Preference instruments. This did not occur. Self-concept seems to represent a special area of confusion for the schizophrenic.
It is possible that failure had more impact upon schizophrenics than controls because SF subjects were hospitalized for "mental trouble." They might have interpreted failure as a black mark against their desire for discharge or as confirmation that they were sick. Posttest interview data do not, however, support this notion. Brownfain noted that the less stable the self-concept, the greater tends to be one's dependence upon how the environment evaluates him. Higher self-concept variability in the SF group is regarded as reflecting the poorly integrated self-concepts which had to accommodate the failure.
The self-concept includes ideas of one's social acceptability and capacities. It may come under scrutiny by others (i.e., is partially open to consensual validation) and can be challenged by the experiences of life. A stable and reality oriented self-concept would appear important for effective social functioning.
Sullivan has observed the frequent progression in schizophrenia from a nonchronic state, typical of the SF and SNF subjects of this study, to a paranoid resolution involving fixed false beliefs. Some of the schizophrenics in this study were beginning to show early signs of paranoid development with suspiciousness and vague ideas of reference. Having established a factor of self-concept instability in the schizophrenic groups of this study, it is useful to question its potential significance. It seems possible that the progression toward paranoid states, as described by Sullivan and observable in the present schizophrenic group, can be interpreted from the standpoint of self-concept theory. Without a stable selfconcept, one is apt to be constantly anxious, unable to plan ahead and have difficulty in communicating effectively or anticipating the reactions of others (Arieti, 1955; Lecky, 1945) . By seizing upon some beliefs, however false, and holding to them tenaciously, the person becomes temporarily more secure. He may be unable to function outside of the protective environment of a hospital, but this is a small price to pay for relief from anxiety and confusion. His system of self-referred beliefs becomes unshakable. If he permits himself doubt about it, he risks precipitation into vast confusion. Finding himself without family, job, and other important props to his sense of identity, increasing doubt may assail the recently hospitalized schizophrenic. These further dispose him toward the adoption of a reliable, if invalid, self-system.
While high variability of self-concept does not distinguish a person as schizophrenic (there was considerable overlapping between groups in this study), it does appear that self-concept disorder is an important feature of many nonchronic schizophrenics and may significantly influence symptom development.
Therapy for the schizophrenic might be substantially improved by closer attention to the patient's self-concept. After obtaining information about how the patient sees himself, the therapist, in the role of rational, consistent, and benign parent surrogate, may help the person to develop and test durable realistic views about himself. The therapist must serve as a sounding board for attempts at selfdefinition and consensual validator of those self-perceptions which conform to present reality or the potential development of the person. Though the destructive effects of early relationships may never be completely nullified, a brake may be put upon the desperate adoption of new symptoms which lead to further alienation from society and resistance to recovery.
